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Abstract
We analyze a game in which firms with private information compete for workers by
making a single salary offer. Once salaries are chosen, firms make offers to workers, who
care only about salary. Firms and workers are matched according to the Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance algorithm that dominates the theory of two-sided matching. For a
two-firm, two-worker model, we prove existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which
each firm type chooses a salary according to a continuous distribution with interval
support in the salary space. We find a ‘separation’ of types in equilibrium, in the sense
that between two types with a common most preferred worker, one type always makes
higher offers than the other type. The type that makes the higher offers depends on the
relative marginal values attached to the workers by the different firm types. Moreover,
more ‘popular’ workers attract higher average equilibrium salaries.
We also consider an extension of the model to larger markets by replicating the two-
firm, two-worker case, in order to examine the effects of market size on competition and
equilibrium salaries. In the limit, there is no aggregate uncertainty about the realization
of firm types. We characterize the equilibria for this limit case in which there are a
continuum of firms and a continuum of workers divided into two equal-sized worker
classes. Finally, we conjecture the existence and convergence of the sequence of equilibria
in finite replicated markets to the corresponding continuum equilibrium as the number
of replications approaches infinity.
JEL classification numbers: C72, C78, D82, J41
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Salary Competition in Matching Markets with
Private Information
Luke A. Boosey∗
1 Introduction
In competitive labor markets, firms compete with each other along several dimensions.
These include salary, employee benefits, bonuses, health insurance coverage, and oppor-
tunities for career advancement. Firms often set policies regarding benefits, bonuses,
health plans, and vacation time, rather than personalize the terms of employment for
each individual worker. It is also common for firms to decide on a salary for a particular
position, rather than negotiate a salary with each individual. These terms of employment
are often inflexibile, either because they are firm-wide policies, contractual obligations, or
because the salary for the position has been widely advertized. There are other settings
in which agents on one side of a market make a costly investment in order to compete
for the services (or affections) of the agents on the other side of the market. However, in
this paper, we will focus on the case of salary competition between firms.
When choosing the terms of employment to offer to workers, each firm considers the
preferences (or types) of the other firms. However, in most cases, the firms do not have
full information about each other. This paper examines the competitive behavior of
firms when they do not know each others’ preferences. Although there is a great deal of
literature on job matching with salaries when there is complete information, this paper
focuses on understanding the effects of private information on salary competition.
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We analyze a game in which firms with private information compete for workers
by making a single salary offer. We restrict attention to the case in which each firm
wants to hire at most one worker, and each worker can work for only one firm. Firms
have preferences (types) over the set of workers, and the option to remain unmatched.
We assume that firm types are private information, although there is a common prior
distribution over the type space. On the other hand, the workers all rank the firms in
order of salary, from highest to lowest.1 We assume that a firm must commit to a single
salary offer, which they are required to pay to the worker with whom they are eventually
matched. If they are unmatched, then they do not pay anything. Even though we
formulate the problem as one of choosing salaries to offer to the workers, we can also
interpret the decisions of the firms as investments in other terms of employment (such
as fringe benefits, health plans, or available facilities) that make the firm attractive to
potential workers. Under this interpretation, there is less flexibility to personalize the
offers made to different workers for the same position.
Once salaries are chosen, the firms and workers are matched in the following manner.
Each firm makes an offer to at most one worker. Each worker tentatively accepts at
most one offer and rejects all the other offers it receives. Any firm who is rejected then
makes the same offer to another worker who has not already rejected the firm. When
no new offers are made, all remaining tentative matches are confirmed. This matching
process is analogous to the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm introduced by
Gale & Shapley (1962) to prove the existence of stable matchings. A nice property of the
firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is that it gives firms a dominant strategy
to make offers in a straightforward manner. In our setting, it means that firms have a
dominant strategy to make offers in order of preference, but only to workers who are
acceptable to the firm at its chosen salary. Furthermore, given our assumptions about
the preferences of the workers, there is a unique stable matching for any profile of firm
preferences and salary offers. As a result, no worker has an incentive to strategically
reject an offer. This allows us to focus our attention on analyzing the behavior of the
firms when deciding upon their salary offer.
We first consider a two-firm, two-worker model, in which the firms can be one of four
types. The first type prefers worker w1 to worker w2 whilst the second type only finds
worker w1 to be acceptable. The third type prefers w2 to w1 while the fourth type only
finds w2 to be acceptable. Since this is a game of incomplete information, we search for
1This is a significant assumption. It eliminates the difficulty of trying to deal with strategic behavior
in the offer and matching process, as it induces a unique stable matching.
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Bayesian Nash equilibria. We show that there are no pure strategy equilibria. However,
we prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed (distributional) strategies
which are continuous with interval support.
We find a “separation” of types in equilibrium, in the sense that between two types
who have a common most preferred worker, one type always makes higher offers than
the other type. For example, in one case, every salary offered by the second type of
firm (who only wants worker w1) is higher than any salary offered by the first type (who
also wants w1 the most, but considers w2 to be acceptable). That is, all firms of the
first type essentially “admit defeat” for the case in which the other firm is of the second
type. Instead, firms of the first type concentrate on competing against the realization of
another firm of the first type. We show that the relative marginal value attached to the
workers determines which type makes the higher offers in equilibrium. When the realized
types do not share a common most preferred type, there is no competitive pressure on
the salary offers. Therefore, the relative probabilities of being one of the first two types,
compared with the third or fourth types, also influences the equilibrium salaries. We
show that more popular workers (as determined by the distribution over firm types),
attract higher average salaries. Likewise, as one might expect, we show that the higher
the probability of facing a given firm type, the higher the average salary offered by that
type of firm in equilibrium.
We then extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the two-firm, two-worker
market. We prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distribu-
tional strategies with interval support for each finite replicated market. The proof, which
is by construction, also establishes the ‘separation’ result for types with a common most
preferred worker class. We also characterize the equilibrium strategies for the limit case
in which there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers. Finally, we show
numerically that the finite market equilibrium strategies converge to the corresponding
continuum equilibrium strategies as the number of replications approaches infinity.
Section 2 discusses the existing literature on job matching with salaries. The key
observation is that all of this literature assumes that firms have complete information. In
Section 3, we describe the model and the matching process, then introduce the general
two-firm, two-worker game with private information. We construct a simple example to
demonstrate the main features of the equilibrium and identify some of the intuition behind
the behavior of the firms. We then characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria
for which strategies are continuous distributions with interval support. In particular, we
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prove the ‘separation’ result described above for a general two-firm, two-worker model
with private information.
In Section 4, we introduce the extension to larger markets. We build larger markets
while maintaining a manageable type space by replicating the two-firm, two-worker base-
line model. Before discussing the existence and properties of the equilibria for finitely
replicated markets, we characterize the equilibria of the limit case in which there are
a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers. The equilibria for the continuum
case can be derived more easily than for finite markets because there is no aggregate
uncertainty when there are infinitely many firms and workers. Nevertheless, we prove
existence of equilibria for finite replicated markets and then show numerically, that the
equilibrium strategies for the different firm types converge to the corresponding contin-
uum equilibrium as the number of replications approaches infinity.
2 Related Literature
Our work is closely related to a number of other papers that deal with matching firms
to workers by incorporating salary offers. Perhaps the earliest treatment of matching
with salaries is the work by Shapley & Shubik (1972), who modify the work of Gale
& Shapley (1962) to incorporate a transferrable utility good in which salaries can be
paid. They used a linear programming duality approach to prove that there exists a
core allocation, or a one-to-one matching along with a salary schedule, in which no firm
and no worker can negotiate a salary at which they would prefer each other over their
current partners at their current salaries. This work was further developed by Crawford
& Knoer (1981), and subsequently, by Kelso & Crawford (1982), who devised a salary
adjustment process which converges to a core allocation, as described above. According
to this process, firms propose to their favorite worker, based on a given salary schedule.
Workers reject all but their favorite offer, and the rejected firms then update the salary
schedule, by increasing the salary to be offered to workers who have rejected them, and
make new offers. The process ends when there are no rejections issued in some step.
More recently, Hatfield & Milgrom (2005) have developed a model of matching with
contracts that incorporates the Kelso-Crawford model and ascending package auction
models. They show that if the preferences of the firms satisfy a substitutes condition and
a law of aggregate demand condition, then truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for
workers in a worker-proposing matching mechanism.
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Bulow & Levin (2006), in response to an antitrust case brought against the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP), consider the effect of a centralized matching mech-
anism on salary levels. Their paper argues that the NRMP algorithm compresses and
depresses the salaries of the workers, relative to the competitive equilibrium salaries.
Their paper, along with the debate about the effects of the algorithm, has attracted
further work on the issue. Niederle (2007) studies a special feature of the NRMP al-
gorithm that allows firms to make “ordered contracts” which support an equilibrium in
which salaries are competitive. Furthermore, Kojima (2007) shows that if the Bulow &
Levin model is extended to allow for firms with more than one available position, then
the centralized matching algorithm may actually increase salaries relative to competitive
equilibrium. The glaring absence from the existing literature on matching with salaries is
a model in which the firms may have preferences that are private information. All of the
models that have been developed to explain the matching process when firms can make
offers with salaries attached, assume that the preferences are complete information. In
this paper, we provide the first step towards a general model of matching with salaries
under private information.
Our model is most similar to the Bulow & Levin setup. However, our models differ in
two main ways. Perhaps most importantly, we allow the firms to have different primitive
preferences over the workers, whereas Bulow & Levin assume that all firms rank workers
in the same way, according to their publicly known productivity. By allowing for firms
to have different preferences over the workers, we are able to relax the assumption of
complete information. Instead, we suppose that each firm’s type is private information,
drawn independently from a commonly known distribution over the type space. This is
where our model departs from the existing literature on matching with salaries.
3 A Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
Suppose there are two firms f1, f2 ∈ F and two workers w1, w2 ∈ W . Each firm has strict
preferences over the set {w1, w2, ∅}, where ∅ represents being unmatched. We ignore any
preference ranking in which remaining single is the most preferred option. Thus, there
are four possible preference rankings for each firm.
Pa : w1w2 ∅ Pb : w1 ∅w2
Pc : w2w1 ∅ Pd : w2 ∅w1.
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We assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values, one for each
worker, while the value of remaining unmatched is 0. This assumption is somewhat
restrictive, since it means that two firms with same preference ranking also have the
same values for the workers. In Section 5, I discuss ways to relax this assumption about
the type space.
We refer to a firm with preferences Pk as a firm of type k. Then the set of firm types
is described as Pf = {a, b, c, d} where, for example, a = (a1, a2) and aj is the value of
worker j to type a for each j = 1, 2. In order to represent the preference rankings, we
have the following restrictions on the values of the different types.
a1 > a2 > 0
b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0
d2 > 0 > d1 .
Definition 1. A worker w is acceptable to firm f if f prefers w to remaining un-
matched.
We modify this standard notion of an acceptable worker to account for the preferences
of the firms at a given salary level.
Definition 2. Given any salary, xf , chosen by firm f , a worker w is salary-acceptable
to firm f if f ’s value for worker w is greater than xf .
The values corresponding to each type are common knowledge, however, each firm
knows only its own type. The types are drawn independently according to the common
prior distribution pi over Pf = {a, b, c, d}. Given the two disjoint sets of agents, we define
a matching as follows.
Definition 3. A matching is a function µ : F ∪W → F ∪W ∪ ∅ such that
(1) µ(f) ∈ W ∪ ∅ for all f ∈ F ,
(2) µ(w) ∈ F ∪ ∅ for all w ∈ W , and
(3) µ(µ(i)) = i for all i ∈ F ∪W with µ(i) 6= ∅.
We let M denote the set of all matchings.
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For any firm f with type k = (k1, k2), the utility derived from a matching µ ∈ M is
given by
ufk(µ) =

k1 if µ(f) = w1
k2 if µ(f) = w2
0 if µ(f) = ∅
.
Before the matching is determined, the firms each choose a salary. Then the following
steps determine the matching outcome.
Step 1: Each firm makes an offer to (at most) one worker;
Step 2: Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer, and rejects all others;
...
Step k: Any firm whose most recent offer was rejected may make the same salary offer
to a worker who has not already rejected them;
Step k + 1: Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer out of the one (if any) it
tentatively holds, and the new offers received at Step k, and rejects all others.
The procedure terminates when no new offers are made, and then all tentative matches
are confirmed.
In principle, both the firms and workers could adopt a large number of different strate-
gies, some of which may be incredibly complex. Fortunately, we do not need to consider
every strategy, as the following two remarks make clear.
Remark 1. For any set of chosen salaries, each firm has a dominant strategy to make
offers in order of preference to salary-acceptable workers only.
Once firms have chosen salaries, the matching procedure described above is equivalent
to the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm for a very particular matching
market. The relevant matching market is the one in which the firms’ preferences are
their original preferences, restricted to their (respective) sets of salary-acceptable work-
ers, and workers’ preferences are given by ranking the firms according to salary, from
highest to lowest. It follows from Theorem 5 in Roth (1982), that firms have a dominant
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strategy to make offers in order of preferences, but restricted to salary-acceptable workers.
Remark 2. For any profile of firm preferences and any set of chosen salaries, each
worker has a dominant strategy to reject all but the highest salary offered to them.
Recall that the firm-proposing DA mechanism is stable. That is, for any profile of
reported preferences, it produces a matching that is stable with respect to the reported
preferences. Since all the workers have the same preferences, there is a unique stable
matching for each realization of firm preferences and set of chosen salaries. By Theo-
rem 4.16 in Roth & Sotomayor (2006), every set of worker strategies that form a Nash
equilibrium with the truthful strategies of the firms produces a matching that is stable
with respect to the true preferences. Then since each induced market has a unique stable
matching, and the matching mechanism is stable, there is no other Nash equilibrium
strategy that dominates truth-telling by the workers, for any realization of firm types.
Since there are no incentives for strategic sequencing of offers by the firms, or strategic
rejection by the workers, we focus our attention on the behavior of the firms when they
decide upon a salary. We can describe the outcomes from the matching process outlined
above by a direct revelation outcome function g. Let g : P × R2+ →M be an outcome
function that maps the preferences (types) of the two firms and the salaries chosen by the
firms into the set of matchings. As we noted above, the firms have a dominant strategy
to announce their true preferences over salary-acceptable workers and the workers simply
reject all but the highest offer made to them.
3.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
Consider the game Γ =
(
F,W,P ,R+, pi,g, {ufk}f,k
)
. We have the set of firms F , workers
W , the firm type space P , the space of possible salaries R+, and the type distribution pi.
The outcome function g represents the matching process described above, and {ufk}f,k
are the utility functions for each firm and each firm type over the set of matchings.
A pure strategy for a firm f is a function sf : Pf → R+ which selects a salary for
each possible firm type. Given a strategy s−f for the other firm, firm f ’s expected payoff
from announcing a salary xf when its type is k is given by
EU fk
(
xf , s−f ,
)
=
∑
p∈P−f
pi(p) · ufk [g (k, p, xf , s−f (p))] .
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We argue that there is no pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium to this game.
Consider any arbitrary pair of strategies (s1, s2) and suppose firm 1’s type is a. Notice
that, if firm 2’s type is either of c or d, then regardless of s1(a), firm 1 is matched with
worker w1. However, if firm 2’s type is a or b, then the outcome depends on the salaries
announced by the firms.
If firm 2 is playing s2, then firm 1’s best response is to announce s1(a) = max{s2(a), s2(b)}+
ε as long as s1(a) ≤ a1−a2. If max{s2(a), s2(b)} ≥ a1−a2, then firm 1’s best response is
to announce s1(a) = 0. However, given the choice of firm 1, s1(a) = max{s2(a), s2(b)}+ε,
firm 2’s best response, if it is type a, is to offer s2(a) = s1(a) + ε, up to s2(a) ≤ a1 − a2.
The same type of ‘incremental’ best responses exist for type b firms, and by symmetry,
also for types c and d.
The problem with pure strategies is that firms who have a common most preferred
worker will continue to outbid each other until the marginal benefit of ‘winning’ the
worker is equal to the marginal benefit of not winning. However, once that point is
reached, the best response is to announce a salary of 0, and begin the upbidding process
all over again. Instead we look for equilibria in mixed strategies. Given the symmetric
nature of the game, we search for a symmetric equilibrium.
3.2 Mixed (Distributional) Strategy Equilibria
Formally, a mixed strategy for firm i is a function σi : P → ∆(R+) which announces, for
each preference type, a distribution over salaries in R+. We will refer to the symmetric
equilibrium (σ∗, σ∗) by the equilibrium strategy σ∗ = (G∗a, G
∗
b , G
∗
c , G
∗
d) where G
∗
k is the
cumulative distribution announced by the firms when their type is k. We assume that
strategies are continuous distributions with interval support.2 We establish the existence
of a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in distributional strategies that are continuous
with interval support.
Before we prove any results, we provide a simple example for the two-firm, two-worker
model.
2There may be other types of symmetric equilibria, with non-interval support, or discontinuous
strategies. In addition, there may be asymmetric equilibria.
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Example 1. Suppose a = (2, 1), b = (2,−1), c = (1, 2), and d = (−1, 2), while pi(a) = 1
2
,
pi(b) = 1
8
, pi(c) = 1
4
, and pi(d) = 1
8
. Notice that the marginal benefit to getting worker w1
is higher for type b than type a, and the marginal benefit to getting worker w2 is higher
for type d than type c. Given these parameters, we conjecture that type b firms will make
higher offers than type a firms, and type d firms will make higher offers than type c firms.
Furthermore, given the distribution of types pi, worker w1 is in a sense more popular than
w2. As such, we might expect to see higher salaries on average being offered to w1.
We find an equilibrium described as follows:
G∗a(x) = 2x on the support
[
0,
1
2
]
G∗b(x) =
7x− 3.5
2− x on the support
[
1
2
,
11
16
]
G∗c(x) = 4x on the support
[
0,
1
4
]
G∗d(x) =
7x− 1.75
2− x on the support
[
1
4
,
15
32
]
.
There are several interesting features exhibited by this equilibrium. One observation
is that there is no overlap between the equilibrium supports of types with a common
most preferred worker. Since the marginal value of getting worker w1 is less for type a
than for type b, firms of type b always announce higher salaries than firms of type a.
In other words, firms of type a are resigned to getting their second favorite worker (w2)
when the other firm is type b.
Instead, a type a firm focuses just on competing against another type a firm. In
contrast, a type b firm offers enough to ensure that it outbids any type a firm, then
competes against the chance that the other firm is also type b. This type of ‘separation’
result between types a and b is also exhibited by types c and d, and we show below that it
is a characteristic of any equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval
support.
Another feature of the equilibrium for this example is that salaries are higher on
average for firms of type a than type c and for type b than type d, even though they have
comparable values for their respective preferences. This reflects the relative ‘popularity’ of
worker w1 relative to worker w2. This notion of popularity is manifested in the differences
in the probabilities of facing another firm with the same most preferred worker. For types
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a and b, the probability of facing another type a or b is 5
8
, while for types c and d, the
probability of facing another type c or d is only 3
8
. As a result, the average salaries
offered in equilibrium are higher for type a than type c, and higher for type b than type
d. Below, we show that this feature is a general result that applies to all equilibria of the
game.
Consider again the general model. Note that the strategies of types that share a
common most preferred worker affect each other. On the other hand, salaries do not af-
fect the matching output when the realized types do not have a common most preferred
worker. Thus, we can consider pairs of types in isolation from one another. Without
loss of generality, we consider types a and b. The following two lemmas allow us to
characterize the supports for the equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 1. Between types with a common most preferred worker, the lowest salary offered
in equilibrium must be 0.
Proof
Let [xa, xa] and [xb, xb] be the equilibrium supports for types a and b respectively. Suppose
by means of contradiction that neither xa nor xb is equal to 0. Consider 0 < xa ≤ xb.
Type a’s expected payoff from x = xa is
EUa(xa) = [pi(a) + pi(b)]a2 + [pi(c) + pi(d)]a1 − xa
and for any x ∈ [0, xa), type a’s expected payoff is
EUa(x) = [pi(a) + pi(b)]a2 + [pi(c) + pi(d)]a1 − x
< EUa(xa).
This means that [xa, xa] cannot be an equilibrium support unless xa = 0 or 0 ≤ xb < xa.
If 0 < xb ≤ xa, type b’s expected payoff from x = xb is
EUb(xb) = (b1 − xb)[pi(c) + pi(d)].
That is, at the lower bound of type b’s equilibrium support, a firm of type b does not
get matched to a worker unless the other firm is type c or type d. But in those cases,
the salary does not affect the outcome, so that choosing a salary of xb > 0 is strictly
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dominated by x = 0. Thus, [xb, xb] cannot be an equilibrium support unless xb = 0 or
0 ≤ xa < xb. Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have either xa = 0 or xb = 0. 
A similar proof technique helps to prove the next lemma, which further restricts the
type of supports that we can expect in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, there are no gaps between the equilibrium supports for types
with a common most preferred worker.
Proof
Suppose xa < xb. Then ∀x ∈ (xa, xb), type b’s expected payoff is
EUb(x) = (b1 − x)(1− pi(b))
> (b1 − xb)(1− pi(b)) = EUb(xb),
contradicting the inclusion of xb in the equilibrium support for type b. The proof is
similar for the case when xb < xa. Since the supports are intervals by assumption, there
are no other cases to be considered. 
These two lemmas imply that equilibria must be consistent with one of four cases. In
each case, type a mixes over [xa, xa], and type b mixes over [xb, xb], where
Case 1: 0 = xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Case 2: 0 = xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Case 3: [xa, xa] ⊂ [xb, xb], and xb = 0
Case 4: [xb, xb] ⊂ [xa, xa], and xa = 0.
The proposition below generalizes and formalizes the ‘separation’ result we found for
the equilibrium in the example, and shows that there are no equilibria of the form de-
scribed by Case 3 or Case 4.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium supports do not overlap for types with a common most
preferred worker. In particular then, all equilibria must be of the form in Case 1 with
xb = xa or Case 2 with xa = xb.
12
Proof
See Appendix. 
The proof for Proposition 1 is based on demonstrating that we cannot simultaneously
satisfy indifference for both types on an interval with non-empty interior. As a result, the
equilibrium supports in Case 1 and Case 2 must meet at their boundaries. For Case 3
and Case 4, the same argument implies that the support which is a subset of the other
must be a single point. However, since we have already ruled out best responses in pure
strategies, there cannot exist an equilibrium in either of these cases.
The next proposition characterizes all of the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in
which strategies are continuous with interval support. Moreover, it provides the set of
conditions that determine, for each pair of types with a common most preferred worker,
whether their equilibrium supports are consistent with Case 1 or Case 2. The condition
depends on the relative marginal benefits of getting the types’ common most preferred
worker, and on the probability that a firm is the type that also finds the other worker
acceptable.
Proposition 2. If b1 > pi(a)(a1 − a2), then in all equilibria,
G∗a(x) =
x
pi(a)(a1 − a2)
on the support
[
0, pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
G∗b(x) =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)(b1 − x) [x− pi(a)(a1 − a2)]
on the support
[
pi(a)(a1 − a2), pi(b)b1 + (1− pi(b))pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
,
regardless of G∗c , G
∗
d. The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 > pi(c)(c2 − c1).
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If b1 < pi(a)(a1 − a2), then in all equilibria,
G∗b(x) =
x(pi(c) + pi(d))
pi(b)(b1 − x)
on the support
[
0,
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a)
]
G∗a(x) =
(1− pi(a))x− pi(b)b1
pi(a)(1− pi(a))(a1 − a2)
on the support
[
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a) ,
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a) + pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
.
The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 < pi(c)(c2 − c1).
Proof
See Appendix. 
Part of the condition in Proposition 2 has a simple intuition. If type b gets a higher
value from worker w1 than the marginal value for type a from getting w1 instead of w2,
then type b will be willing to pay more than type a for w1. The role of pi(a) in the
condition is less obvious. Keeping the values fixed, if pi(a) is relatively low, a type a firm
does not need to mix over a large interval to compete against its own type. As a result,
if type a firms offer salaries above those offered by type b, there may be an incentive for
type b firms to offer salaries higher than the type a firms in order to ‘steal’ worker w1 in
the event that the other firm is type a. Any such deviation by type b firms would give
type a firms an incentive to lower the support of their distributional strategies to a lower
bound of 0.
The following two corollaries of Proposition 2 confirm two expected features of the
equilibrium. All things being equal, the more likely a firm is to face another firm of the
same type, the stronger the competitive pressure and the higher the average equilibrium
salary for their firm type. Similarly, the more likely a firm is to face another firm with
the same most preferred worker, the stronger the competition and the higher the average
equilibrium salary offered by the two relevant firm types.
Corollary 1. The higher the probability a firm type has to compete against its own type,
the higher (on average) the equilibrium salary offered by that firm type.
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Proof
In Case 1, the expected salary offer of firm type a is just the expected value of a uniform
random variable on
[
0, pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
- that is,
E(xa) =
pi(a)(a1 − a2)
2
,
which is strictly increasing in pi(a). For type b, the expected salary is
E(xb) =
pi(b)b1+(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2)∫
pi(a)(a1−a2)
x · g∗b (x)dx. (1)
Recall that the distribution
G∗b(x) =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)(b1 − x) [x− pi(a)(a1 − a2)] ,
which gives
g∗b (x) =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)
(
b1 − pi(a)(a1 − a2)
(b1 − x)2
)
. (2)
Since b1 > pi(a)(a1 − a2) for this case, we have b1 > x, and g∗b (x) is increasing in x.
Furthermore,
∂g∗b (x)
∂pi(b)
= −b1 − pi(a)(a1 − a2)
[pi(b)(b1 − x)]2 < 0 (3)
implies that g∗b (x) decreases as pi(b) increases. However,
∂2g∗b (x)
∂pi(b)2
is also negative, which
means that the decrease in g∗b (x) from an increase in pi(b) is more severe for lower values
of x.
Since the upper bound of the integration is increasing in pi(b), the expected value of
the salary offered by type b must be increasing with pi(b), since we assign positive weight
to higher salaries not previously included, and the weight attached to those salaries that
were previously included falls more for lower salaries than higher salaries.
The proof for Case 2 is a similar series of calculations to verify that the expected
salary is increasing in the probability of the firm type. We should also mention that, for
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some values of b1 and a1−a2, as pi(a) is increasing, it may cause the equilibrium to switch
from Case 1 to Case 2. In this case, there is some chance that the average equilibrium
salary will jump down (or up), however, for any further increases in pi(a), the result will
continue to hold. 
Corollary 2. For any firm, the higher the probability that the other firm has the same
most preferred worker, the higher the equilibrium salary (on average) offered by the firm.
Proof
We show that the average equilibrium salary for a given firm type is non-decreasing in
the probability of the other firm type with the same most preferred worker. Together
with Corollary 1, this implies the result. For Case 1, type a’s expected salary does not
depend on pi(b). On the other hand, for type b, both the lower and upper bounds of the
support increase with pi(a). Futhermore, g∗b (x) is decreasing in pi(a), but does so more
severely for lower salaries. Therefore, the expected salary for type b increases with pi(a).
Again, we follow the same steps for proving the result in Case 2, and show that in
that case, the expected salary for type a is actually increasing in pi(b). We also reiterate
the caveat that for some values of b1 and a1 − a2, an increase in pi(a) may cause the
equilibrium to switch from Case 1 to Case 2. For type b, this means that the expected
salary ought to jump down discretely, lowering the expected salaries of type b for high
enough values of pi(a). Nevertheless, within a particular case, the expected salary for
type b is increasing in pi(a). 
4 Competition in Replicated Markets
In this section, we examine equilibrium behavior in large markets. For tractability, we
replicate the two-firm, two-worker market to obtain a market with 2n firms and 2n
workers, consisting of n identical “class w1” workers and n identical “class w2” workers.
First, we characterize the equilibria for the case in which there are a continuum of firms
and a continuum of workers. Then we prove existence, for finite replicated markets, of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval supports.
We show that both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 generalize to replicated markets.
Finally, we show numerically that the limit of the sequence of replicated market equi-
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libria as the number of replications approaches infinity is the corresponding equilibrium
for the market with a continuum of agents. This suggests that replication reduces ag-
gregate uncertainty about the realization of types among the firms. As a result, salary
competition increases with replication for the more popular worker class, while it even-
tually disappears for the less popular class.
4.1 Market Replication
In order to avoid the complexity of dealing with an exponentially growing number of firm
types, we analyze a baseline model with two distinct workers who are replicated to form
larger markets with many firms. This provides a convenient way to conduct a tractable
analysis of competitive behavior in large markets. Furthermore, it removes the chance of
realizing an uninteresting market with sparse competition, in which every firm wants a
different type of worker.
To be more specific, the baseline market is one with two firms, F 1 = {f1, f2} and
two distinct workers W = {w1, w2}. In an n-replicated market, there are 2n firms,
F n = {f1, ..., f2n}, along with n copies of w1, W1 = {w11, w21, ..., wn1}, and n copies of w2,
W2 = {w12, ..., wn2}. Since wj1 and wk1 are identical copies of one another, we assume that
all firms are indifferent between any two workers in W1. Likewise, all firms are indifferent
between any two workers in W2. As a result, we can define firms’ preferences (and from
these, their types) as strict orderings over the set {W1,W2, ∅}.
As in section 3, we rule out the possibility of firm types that prefer being unmatched
over every worker.3 So we are left with four possible firm types that are essentially the
same as the types in the two-firm, two-worker case, except that the preferences are over
classes of workers W1 and W2.
Pa : W1W2 ∅ Pb : W1 ∅W2
Pc : W2W1 ∅ Pd : W2 ∅W1.
We again assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values - one for
each worker class, W1 and W2 - while the value of remaining unmatched is normalized
to 0. So, for each type k ∈ {a, b, c, d}, we have k = (k1, k2), where ki is the value of
each worker w in the class Wi. For the values to represent the corresponding preference
3We may just as well assume that they don’t enter the market in the first place.
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rankings, they must satisfy
a1 > a2 > 0
b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0
d2 > 0 > d1 .
Each firm knows only its own type, and the types are drawn independently according to
the common prior distribution pi over {a, b, c, d}. That is, pi(k) is the probability that a
given firm is a type k firm, or equivalently, has preferences Pk.
4.2 Equilibrium in the Continuum Case
Before analyzing the equilibria for a finite replicated market, we examine the equilibrium
behavior in the limit, when there is a continuum of firms, and continuum of workers,
such that the measure of workers in each class W1 and W2 is half the total measure of
W . In this environment, since there are infinitely many firms, the aggregate uncertainty
about the realized firm types disappears from the market. That is, pi(k) is the actual
proportion, or the measure of type k firms in the market. This is a convenient feature
because it makes the equilibrium strategies relatively straightforward functions of the
distribution pi.
As for the two-firm, two-worker case, we can establish that the equilibrium strategy
for a given type k does not depend on the strategies of the two types k′, k′′ that have a
different most preferred worker class than type k. Thus, as in section 3, when deriving
equilibrium strategies, we can deal with types a and b independently from types c and d.
We consider only types a and b, since the analysis will be symmetric for types c and d.
The following proposition provides a characterization of the equilibria. The proposition
is broken into two cases based on the relative marginal values for types a and b of worker
class W1 over W2.
Proposition 3. The following two cases characterize the equilibria when there are a
continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, with two equally large worker classes.
Case 1: b1 ≥ a1 − a2
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• If pi(a) + pi(b) ≤ 1
2
, then x∗a = 0 and x
∗
b = 0.
• If pi(a) > 1
2
, then x∗b = a1 − a2 and
x∗a =
0 with probability pa(0) =
2(pi(a)+pi(b))−1
2pi(a)
a1 − a2 with probability 1− pa(0)
.
• If pi(b) > 1
2
, then x∗a = 0 and x
∗
b = b1.
• If pi(a) ≤ 1
2
, pi(b) ≤ 1
2
, but pi(a) + pi(b) > 1
2
, then x∗b = a1 − a2 and
x∗a =
0 with probability pa(0) =
2(pi(a)+pi(b))−1
2pi(a)
a1 − a2 with probability 1− pa(0)
.
Case 2: b1 < a1 − a2
• If pi(a) + pi(b) ≤ 1
2
, then x∗a = 0 and x
∗
b = 0.
• If pi(a) > 1
2
, then x∗b ∈ [0, b1] and
x∗a =
0 with probability qa(0) =
2pi(a)−1
2pi(a)
a1 − a2 with probability 1− qa(0)
.
• If pi(b) > 1
2
, then x∗a = b1 and x
∗
b = b1.
• If pi(a) ≤ 1
2
, pi(b) ≤ 1
2
, but pi(a) + pi(b) > 1
2
, then x∗a = b1 and x
∗
b = b1.
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical illustrations of the two cases in Proposition 3. Each
figure plots pi(a) against pi(b) and divides the space of probability pairs (pi(b), pi(a)) into
segments for each subcase of the equilibrium characterization. In both Figure 1 and
Figure 2, the bottom left triangle corresponds to the case in which there is an excess
supply of class W1 workers, and therefore no competition between types a and b. Thus,
x∗a = x
∗
b = 0 for both cases when pi(a) + pi(b) ≤ 12 .
In Figure 1, we can merge the subcase in which pi(a) > 1
2
with the subcase in which
pi(a) ≤ 1
2
and pi(b) ≤ 1
2
, but pi(a) + pi(b) > 1
2
, since in each subcase, type a firms mix
between 0 and a1 − a2 with probability pa(0) = 2[pi(a)+pi(b)]−12pi(a) , while type b firms choose
a1 − a2. Finally, in the case when pi(b) > 12 , type b firms compete with each other and
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push the salary up to their marginal value from a class W1 worker, while type a firms
know that they will not be matched with a class W1 worker and so choose a salary of 0.
Figure 1: Continuum Equilibria for b1 ≥ a1 − a2
In Figure 2, we can likewise merge the subcase in which pi(b) > 1
2
with the subcase
in which pi(a) ≤ 1
2
and pi(b) ≤ 1
2
, but pi(a) + pi(b) > 1
2
, since in each subcase, both type a
firms and type b firms choose a salary of b1. When pi(a) >
1
2
, type a firms mix between
0 and a1 − a2 with probability qa(0) = 2pi(a)−12pi(a) , while type b firms choose a salary in the
interval [0, b1]. This is because type a firms drive the salary for a class W1 worker up to
a1−a2 > b1, so that type b firms are never matched with anyone. Since some of the type
a firms will miss out on a class W1 worker, they mix between the salary a1 − a2 and 0.
From Proposition 3, given any set of values for the types and a type distribution pi,
we can determine the continuum equilibrium. This provides us with a benchmark for
the limit case. In the next subsection, we consider the conjecture that the sequence of
equilibria in n-replicated markets converge to the relevant continuum equilibrium as n
approaches infinity. Since the result is not yet proved, we just mention the main elements
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Figure 2: Continuum Equilibria for b1 < a1 − a2
of the proof technique to be addressed.
4.3 Finite Replicated Markets and Equilibrium Convergence
In finite replicated markets, the analysis is made more difficult since the firms face ag-
gregate uncertainty about the realization of firm types. In order to establish convergence
of the equilibria in finite replicated markets to the continuum equilibrium, we need to
first establish the existence for an n-replicated market, of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in continuous, mixed (distributional) strategies with interval support.
4.3.1 Existence
As in both the two-firm, two-worker and the continuum cases, the equilibrium depends
on the parameters of the model. We can break up the proof of existence into several
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cases. The proof is by construction. We consider firm types a and b, although things are
symmetric for types c and d.
Proposition 4. Given any finite replicated market with 2n firms, n workers in class W1
and n workers in class W2, there exists an equilibrium (G
∗
a(·), G∗b(·), G∗c(·), G∗d(·)) such
that G∗k(·) is a continuous distribution with interval support in the salary space, for all
k = a, b, c, d. The equilibrium supports for types a and b satisfy
0 = xa < xa = xb < xb
or 0 = xb < xb = xa < xa.
The analogous result holds for the equilibrium supports of types c and d.
Proof
See Appendix. 
4.3.2 Convergence of Finite Market Equilibria
Next we show numerically that the replicated market equilibrium strategies converge
point-wise to the corresponding continuum equilibrium as the number of replications goes
to infinity. We return to Example 1 to demonstrate this result. Recall that a = (2, 1),
b = (2,−1), c = (1, 2), and d = (−1, 2), while pi(a) = 1
2
, pi(b) = 1
8
, pi(c) = 1
4
, and
pi(d) = 1
8
. The corresponding continuum equilibrium is as follows,
x∗a =
0 with probability 141 with probability 3
4
(4)
x∗b = 1 (5)
x∗c = 0 (6)
x∗d = 0. (7)
Therefore, we need to show that the equilibrium distributions for types b, c, and d
converge to degenerate distributions with all the mass placed on a single salary (1 for
type b, 0 for types c and d), and that the equilibrium distribution for type a converges
to a discrete distribution that places mass 1
4
on 0 and mass 3
4
on 1.
Now recall that the equilibrium distribution for a type a firm in an n-replicated market
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satisfies
xa = 0
xa = (a1 − a2)
[ n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(b)− pi(a)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
]
and for all x ∈ [xa, xa],
x = (a1 − a2)
n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
[
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(a)− pi(b)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
×
n−j−1∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(x)
k−t[1−G∗a(x)]t
]
.
We can use the last equation to solve, given any value of G∗a(x), for the corresponding
value of x. We calculated the pairs
(
x,G∗a(x)
)
that satisfy the indifference equations
for several different values of n. If we plot these pairs with x on the horizontal axis and
G∗a(x) on the vertical axis, we have a good representation of the equilibrium distribution
for the different sized markets. We illustrate these in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Replicated Market Equilibria for Type a
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented three main results. The first is that in any mixed strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium with continuous strategies on interval supports, the equi-
librium supports for types with a common most preferred worker meet at a common
boundary. We call this our separation result. Our second result is a characterization of
the mixed strategy, Bayesian Nash equilibria for a general two-firm, two-worker model
with private information. We derive conditions on the relative marginal values of types
with common most preferred workers that determine which of the types chooses the
higher support.
There are several potential extensions on the simple two-firm, two-worker model. The
most natural of these is to extend the model to a general n-firm, n-worker model. To
ease the transition, we restrict the workers to be in one of two classes, denoted by W1 and
W2. In order to examine larger environments, we consider replicated markets, using the
two-firm, two-worker model as the baseline case. Our third result is a characterization of
the equilibria for the limit case in which there are a continuum of firms and continuum
of workers divided between the two classes. Finally, we introduce a conjecture about
the convergence of finitely replicated market equilibria to the corresponding continuum
equilibrium.
Another extension we might eventually consider is to allow for different proportions of
the two worker classes in the n-firm, n-worker model. Then the competitive pressures on
the salaries for different worker classes will depend not only on the relative ‘popularity’
of the workers, as determined by the type distribution, but also on the relative surplus or
shortage of workers for each class. We also can extend the paper to relax the restriction
that firms with the same preference ordering must have the same utility representation
for that ordering. For instance, let each firm’s type be a pair of values (x, y), each drawn
independently from some interval [θ, θ] according to a given distribution.
The two-firm, two-worker model, or indeed a small n×n model with just two worker
classes, is both simple enough and interesting enough that it could form the basis for a
series of experiments examining the strategic behavior of the firms. Although the model
is designed to give firms a dominant strategy to make offers in order of preference, we
would also have a chance to examine the sequence of offers chosen by the subject firms
in an experiment. A body of experimental data might provide some indication of the
strategies firms actually play when their types are private information.
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Finally, it would be useful to examine how the theoretical results in this paper fit with
empirical observations in different labor markets. In many labor markets, salaries do not
accurately reflect differences in productivity. Instead, salaries tend to exhibit much less
variation than worker productivities. Even though our model does not include explicit
levels of productivity, a modified version may provide some explanation for this empirical
trend in workers’ salaries.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1: 0 = xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Consider the interval [xb, xa], on which both firm types a and b make offers. Suppose
by means of contradiction that this interval has a nonempty interior. For type a, the
expected payoff for any salary in the interval is
EUa(x) = (a1 − a2)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x) + pi(b)G
∗
b(x)
]
− (a1 − a2)
[
pi(a) + pi(b)
]
+ a1 − x
for all x ∈ [xb, xa]. To make type a indifferent on the interval, we must have
g∗a(x) =
1
pi(a)(a1 − a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
g∗b (x), ∀x ∈ [xb, xa]. (8)
Integrating equation (8) with respect to x yields
G∗a(x) = G
∗
a(xb) +
x− xb
pi(a)(a1 − a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
G∗b(x), (9)
for all x ∈ [xb, xa].
On the other hand, type b has expected payoff
EUb(x) = (b1 − x)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x) + pi(b)G
∗
b(x) + pi(c) + pi(d)
]
, ∀x ∈ [xb, xa].
For type b to be indifferent on the interval, we need
g∗b (x)−
G∗b(x)
b1 − x =
pi(c) + pi(d) + pi(a)G∗a(x)
pi(b)(b1 − x) −
pi(a)
pi(b)
g∗a(x).
Solving this differential equation and using integration by parts, we find
G∗b(x) =
η(x)− η(xb)
pi(b)(b1 − x) , ∀x ∈ [xb, xa], (10)
where η(s) = s(pi(c) + pi(d)) − pi(a)G∗a(s)(b1 − s). Then, by substituting equation (10)
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into equation (9) and simplifying, we must have
G∗a(xb) =
1
pi(a)
[
b1 − x
a1 − a2 − pi(c)− pi(d)
]
(11)
for every x ∈ [xb, xa]. Since pi(a) > 0 and a1 > a2, the right hand side of equation (11)
is strictly decreasing in x, which implies that the interior of the interval [xb, xa] must be
empty. That is, xb = xa.
Case 2: 0 = xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Consider the interval [xa, xb], on which both type a and type b make offers. Suppose
again by contradiction that this interval has a nonempty interior. For type b, the expected
payoff for any salary in the interval is
(b1 − x)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x) + pi(b)G
∗
b(x) + pi(c) + pi(d)
]
. To make type b indifferent on the interval, we must have
g∗b (x)−
G∗b(x)
b1 − x =
pi(c) + pi(d) + pi(a)G∗a(x)
pi(b)(b1 − x) −
pi(a)
pi(b)
g∗a(x). (12)
Solving the differential equation (12) and using integration by parts to simplify the so-
lution, we have
G∗b(x) =
(x− xa)(pi(c) + pi(d))
pi(b)(b1 − x) −
pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(x) +
k
b1 − x, ∀x ∈ [xa, xb], (13)
where k is some constant of integration. Using the fact that G∗b(xb) = 1, we can solve for
k = b1 − xb + pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(xb)(b1 − xb)−
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)
(xb − xa). (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) and simplifying gives
G∗b(x) =
b1 − xb
pi(b)(b1 − x)
[
pi(b) + pi(a)G∗a(xb)
]
− pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(x)−
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x)(xb − x). (15)
For type a, the expected payoff for any salary in the interval is
EUa(x) = (a1 − a2)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x) + pi(b)G
∗
b(x)
]
− (a1 − a2)
[
pi(a) + pi(b)
]
+ a1 − x,
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for all x ∈ [xa, xb]. Solving to make type a indifferent and using the fact that G∗a(xa) = 0
by assumption, we have
G∗a(x) =
x− xa
pi(a)(a1 − a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
[
G∗b(x)−G∗b(xa)
]
. (16)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (16) and simplifying yields
x− xa
a1 − a2 +
[pi(c) + pi(d)](xb − x)
b1 − x −
b1 − xb
b1 − x (pi(b) + pi(a)G
∗
a(xb) (17)
=
[pi(c) + pi(d)](xb − xa)
b1 − xa
− b1 − xb
b1 − xa
(pi(b) + pi(a)G∗a(xb)) (18)
for all x ∈ [xa, xb]. Notice that the right hand side of equation (17) is constant. To
maintain equality, the derivative of the left hand side with respect to x must be 0 for
every x ∈ [xa, xb]. However, this derivative,
1
a1 − a2 −
b1 − xb
(b1 − x)2 (pi(c) + pi(d)− pi(b)− pi(a)G
∗
a(xb)), (19)
changes with x unless b1 − xb = 0 or pi(c) + pi(d) = pi(a)G∗a(xb) + pi(b). Furthermore, in
those cases, the equation (19) equals 1
a1−a2 > 0 since a1 > a2. It follows then that the
interior of [xa, xb] must be empty; that is, xa = xb.
Case 3: 0 = xb ≤ xa < xa ≤ xb
Consider the interval [xa, xa], on which both types make offers. As above, we can
solve for
G∗b(x) =
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x)(x− xa)−
pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(x), (20)
for all x ∈ [xa, xa], and
G∗a(x) =
x− xa
pi(a)(a1 − a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
[
G∗b(x)−G∗b(xa)
]
, (21)
for all x ∈ [xa, xa]. In order to satisfy both equation (20) and equation (21), we substitute
the latter into the former and simplify, to obtain
G∗b(xa) =
[
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x) −
1
b1(a1 − a2)
]
(x− xa). (22)
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The left hand side of equation (22) is a constant. To maintain the equality, we must have
the derivative of the right hand side equal to 0 for every x ∈ [xa, xa], which means[
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x) −
1
b1(a1 − a2)
]
=
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x)2 (x− xa) (23)
However, equation (23) has a unique solution, which implies that xa = xa. Since we have
already ruled out pure strategies as best responses, it follows that there are no equilibria
of the form described by Case 3.
Case 4: 0 = xa ≤ xb < xb ≤ xa
The steps to prove that Case 4 cannot occur are analogous to the steps for Case
3. We conclude that in order to simultaneously satisfy the conditions for indifference by
both types on the interval [xb, xb], we must have xb = xb, which we know cannot be true,
since we have already ruled out pure strategies. Thus, there are no equilibria of the form
described by Case 4. 
Proof of Proposition 2
By Proposition 1, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the supports for the strategies of
two types with a common most preferred worker (say, a and b) must satisfy either Case
1 with xa = xb, or Case 2 with xb = xa.
Consider Case 1 and suppose that G∗a(·) and G∗b(·) are the candidate equilibrium
strategies for types a and b. For each salary x in the interval [0, xa], type a firms have
an expected payoff equal to
EUa(x) = a1pi(a)G∗a(x) + a2pi(a)(1−G∗a(x)) + a2pi(b)] + a1[pi(c) + pi(d)]− x.
Since the firm needs to be indifferent between any salary that is offered as part of its
equilibrium strategy, we must have
g∗a(x) =
1
pi(a)(a1 − a2) ∀x ∈ (0, xa]. (24)
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Integrating with respect to x yields
G∗a(x) = G
∗
a(0) +
x∫
0
1
pi(a)(a1 − a2)ds (25)
= G∗a(0) +
x
pi(a)(a1 − a2) , (26)
for all x ∈ [0, xa]. We assume that when both firms choose a salary of 0, the workers flip
a coin if they have to decide between the two offers. As a result, the payoff from x = 0
is strictly less than from some small  > 0. Thus, G∗a(0) = 0. Then we have
G∗a(x) =
x
pi(a)(a1 − a2) ∀x ∈ [0, xa], (27)
and since G∗a(xa) = 1, we can solve for xa = pi(a)(a1 − a2).
Similarly, for each salary x in the interval [xa, xb], type b firms have an expected payoff
equal to
EUb(x) = (b1 − x)[pi(b)G∗b(x) + 1− pi(b)].. (28)
In order for type b firms to be indifferent between all the salaries in the interval [xa, xb],
we must have
g∗b (x)−
G∗b(x)
b1 − x =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)(b1 − x) , ∀x ∈ (xa, xb] (29)
Solving the differential equation in 29 gives
G∗b(x) =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)(b1 − x)(x− xa) +
c
b1 − x, ∀x ∈ [xa, xb]. (30)
G∗b(xb) = 1 allows us to solve for
c = b1 − xb − 1− pi(b)
pi(b)
(xb − xa),
and substitue into equation 30, which simplifies then to
G∗b(x) = 1−
xb − x
pi(b)(b1 − x) , ∀x ∈ [xa, xb]. (31)
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Having solved for xa = pi(a)(a1 − a2), we use the fact that G∗b(xa) = 0 to solve for
xb = pi(b)b1 + (1− pi(b))pi(a)(a1 − a2). (32)
Substituting equation 32 into equation 31 and simplifying gives the equilibrium strategy
for type b firms,
G∗b(x) =
1− pi(b)
pi(b)(b1 − x) [x− pi(a)(a1 − a2)]
on the support
[
pi(a)(a1 − a2), pi(b)b1 + (1− pi(b))pi(a)(a1 − a2)
]
The condition that b1 > pi(a)(a1 − a2) follows immediately, since if b1 < pi(a)(a1 − a2),
then
[
pi(a)(a1−a2), pi(b)b1 +(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
is not an interval; the upper bound
is less than the lower bound. This takes care of Case 1.
Now consider Case 2. For each salary x in the interval [0, xb], type b firms have an
expected payoff equal to
EUb(x) = (b1 − x)[pi(b)G∗b(x) + pi(c) + pi(d)]. (33)
In order for type b firms to be indifferent between all the salaries in the interval [0, xb],
we must have
g∗b (x)−
G∗b(x)
b1 − x =
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x) , ∀x ∈ (0, xb]. (34)
Solving the differential equation in 34 gives
G∗b(x) =
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x)x+
c
b1 − x, ∀x ∈ (0, xb]. (35)
For the same reasons as above, we can easily verify that G∗b(0) = 0, which implies c = 0,
and therefore
G∗b(x) =
pi(c) + pi(d)
pi(b)(b1 − x)x ∀x ∈ [0, xb]. (36)
Since G∗b(xb) = 1, we can solve for xb =
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) .
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For a type a firm, the expected payoff for each salary x ∈ [xb, xa] is given by
EUa(x) = a1pi(a)G∗a(x) + a2pi(a)(1−G∗a(x)) + a1(1− pi(a))− x. (37)
For firm type a to be indifferent on the interval, we must have
g∗a(x) =
1
pi(a)(a1 − a2) , ∀x ∈ [xb, xa]. (38)
Integrating and using the fact that G∗a(xb) = 0, we obtain
G∗a(x) =
x− xb
pi(a)(a1 − a2) , (39)
for all x ∈ [xb, xa]. Then substituting xb = pi(b)b11−pi(a) into equation 39 and simplifying gives
the equilibrium strategy for type a firms,
G∗a(x) =
(1− pi(a))x− pi(b)b1
pi(a)(1− pi(a))(a1 − a2) (40)
on the support
[
pi(b)b1
1− pi(a) , xa
]
. (41)
Finally, using G∗a(xa) = 1 allows us to solve for xa =
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) + pi(a)(a1 − a2). This takes
care of Case 2. The proof for types c and d is identical, except for the notation. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Case 1: Let pi(a) + pi(b) ≥ 1
2
and suppose b1 ≥ a1 − a2.
We conjecture the existence of a pair of equilibrium distributions (G∗a(·), G∗b(·)), with
supports [0, xa] and [xa, xb], respectively. In order to prove that these are in fact equilib-
rium strategies, we first need to show indifference between each of the salaries in their
corresponding equilibrium supports.
First, consider type a firms. For any type a firm f , the expected utility of a salary
xf ∈ (0, xa) is
EUa(xf ) = (a1 − a2) · Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1] + a2 − xf . (42)
The probability Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1] consists of two terms that capture, respectively,
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(1) the probability that the actual number of type a firms and type b firms is less than
or equal to n (the number of class W1 workers), plus
(2) the probability that
– the actual number of type a’s and type b’s is greater than n,
– the number of type b’s is less than n, and
– the number of type a firms that choose x > xf is less than or equal to n− the
number of type b’s.
In any other realization of types and salaries, the firm f is matched with a worker w ∈ W2
and so receives a payoff of a2.
If we let j denote the number of type b firms and k denote the number of type a firms
out of the 2n− 1 other firms, then we can rewrite the first term of Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1] as
n−1∑
s=0
(
2n− 1
s
)[
pi(a) + pi(b)
]s
·
[
1− pi(a)− pi(b)
]2n−1−s
,
and rewrite the second term of Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1] as
n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
[
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(a)− pi(b)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
×
n−j−1∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(xf )
k−t[1−G∗a(xf )]t
]
.
At the lowest salary in type a’s support, xf = 0, the expected payoff is equal to
a2 + (a1 − a2)
[ n−1∑
s=0
(
2n− 1
s
)
[pi(a) + pi(b)]s[1− pi(a)− pi(b)]2n−1−s
]
. (43)
Since the firm must be indifferent between all of the salaries in the support [0, xa], we can
also solve for the value of xa by equating the expected payoffs from xf = 0 and xf = xa.
This implies that
xa = (a1 − a2)
[ n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(b)− pi(a)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
]
. (44)
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Moreover, indifference implies that, for all xf ∈ (0, xa), we have
xf = (a1 − a2)
n−1∑
j=0
2n−1−j∑
k=n+1−j
[
(2n− 1)!pi(b)jpi(a)k[1− pi(a)− pi(b)]2n−1−j−k
j!k!(2n− 1− j − k)!
×
n−j−1∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(xf )
k−t[1−G∗a(x)]t
]
. (45)
The right-hand side of the equation is a continuous function of G∗a(xf ), which we have
assumed is a continuous function of xf . Since the left-hand side is strictly increasing in
xf , it follows that there exists a continuous function G
∗
a(x) that satisfies the equation.
Now consider type b firms. For any type b firm f , the expected utility of a salary
xf ∈ (xa, xb) is
EUb(xf ) = (b1 − xf ) · Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1]. (46)
Since type b firms don’t care about class W2 workers, they are either matched with a class
W1 worker, or remain unmatched. In this case, Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1] consists of two different
terms,
(1) the probability that there are no more than n− 1 other type b firms,
(2) the probability that
– there are more than n− 1 other type b firms, but
– the number of type b firms that choose x > xf is less than or equal to n− 1.
Again we let j denote the number of type b firms, however now let k denote the number
of type b firms that choose x < xf . Then we can write the first term of Pr[µ(f) ∈ W1] as
n−1∑
j=0
(
2n− 1
j
)
pi(b)j[1− pi(b)]2n−1−j, (47)
and the second term as
2n−1∑
j=n
(
2n− 1
j
)
pi(b)j[1− pi(b)]2n−1−j
j∑
k=j−n+1
(
j
k
)
G∗b(xf )
k[1−G∗b(xf )]j−k. (48)
Furthermore, the second term is 0 for xf = xa (the lowest salary in type b’s support),
which means that the equilibrium expected payoff for a type b firm from any x ∈ [xa, xb]
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must be
(b1 − xa)
[ n−1∑
j=0
(
2n− 1
j
)
pi(b)j[1− pi(b)]2n−1−j
]
. (49)
At the top of type b’s support, the probability that any number of other type b’s choose
x < xf = xb is 1. Thus, the expected payoff from choosing xf = xb is just b1 − xb. In
order to ensure indifference, we must have
xb = b1 − (b1 − xa)
[ n−1∑
j=0
(
2n− 1
j
)
pi(b)j[1− pi(b)]2n−1−j
]
. (50)
Finally, for all x ∈ (xa, xb), G∗b(x) must satisfy
b1 − xb
b1 − x =
[ n−1∑
j=0
(
2n− 1
j
)
pi(b)j[1− pi(b)]2n−1−j (51)
+
2n−1∑
j=n
(
2n− 1
j
)
pi(b)j[1− pi(b)]2n−1−j
j∑
k=j−n+1
(
j
k
)
G∗b(xf )
k[1−G∗b(xf )]j−k
]
.

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